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This article examines the question of whether economic interdependence constrains or motivates
interstate conflict. The theoretical model predicts when and how interdependence influences conflict,
using exit costs to separate economic interdependence from less binding economic interaction. Analy-
sis of the model suggests that when exit costs exceed an endurance threshold for at least one state,
the threat of exit becomes a viable but limited bargaining tool. Exceeding this threshold increases
low-level conflict as states use economic and diplomatic tools to resolve demands, but it decreases
high-level conflict because states take advantage of more efficient means of dispute resolution. If the
stakes are too high, however, exit costs fail to check conflict, and the economic relationship becomes
an ineffective bargaining arena. Empirical analysis provides support for the hypotheses derived from
the model.
Does economic interdependence lead to peace or conflict between nations?
When two countries enter an economic relationship characterized by interde-
pendence, are they constrained in their military behavior, or are they adding one
more source of discord? Such questions have been of interest to scholars for cen-
turies, motivated by the hope that economic interdependence will help to extin-
guish interstate conflict and the fear that it will result in one more reason for
states to fight one another. The topic is equally important to the policy world: as
globalization continues to pervade the international arena, policy makers grapple
with the political ramifications of their cross-national economic ties. Scholarly
attention has repeatedly focused on this debate, and in response to Levy’s (1989)
call for research, the last decade has produced a “burgeoning empirical litera-
ture” on the subject (Mansfield and Pollins 2001, 834).
Despite this recent attention, answers to these questions remain elusive. In
current research, economic exchange is hypothesized to affect political conflict
in one of three ways. One perspective argues that economic exchange leads to a
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more peaceful world (Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001; Polachek 1997; Russett
and Oneal 2001). A contradictory body of research asserts that economic
exchange generates more conflictual behavior between states (Barbieri 1996). A
third argument posits that economic exchange is not sufficiently important to have
any impact upon states’ decisions to engage in or avoid political conflict (Buzan
1984; Waltz 1970). This triangulation has yet to produce a convergence of
answers. Recent reviews of the literature identify a prolonged and considerable
debate regarding the existence and direction of a causal arrow between trade and
conflict (Barbieri and Schneider 1999; McMillan 1997). While some of this dis-
agreement can be attributed to different approaches to a complex research puzzle,
the variance in findings remains problematic.
Two general problems hinder our ability to make progress in this debate. Those
who study the relationship between economic interdependence and political 
conflict have largely ignored the literature on the concept of interdependence
(Baldwin 1980; Hirschman 1945; Keohane and Nye 1989; Wagner 1988). To the
extent that conflict scholars have attended to these studies of interdependence,
the focus has been on issues of measurement and symmetry in the economic rela-
tionship (Barbieri 1995). The result is that conflict scholars resort too quickly to
measures of economic activity. Such measures overlook key dimensions of eco-
nomic relationships that distinguish interdependence from interaction. At the
same time, earlier work on the concept of interdependence has never seriously
considered the issue of conflict.
More important, theoretical progress has not matched advances in data col-
lection and research design. Specifically, we lack a theoretical understanding of
when, why, and how economic interdependence influences the decision by nations
to engage in political conflict.1 Too often scholars simply base their hypotheses
on one of the three general arguments discussed above. Morrow (1999) suggests
that this lack of explicit theoretical foundation makes even the most sophisticated
empirical evidence vulnerable to claims of spurious correlation. In their review
of recent contributions to the literature, Mansfield and Pollins conclude that our
attention “needs to be focused on specifying and testing the observable implica-
tions of particular causal mechanisms advanced in theories of interdependence
and conflict” (2001, 841).
This article addresses these two problems. I begin by conceptualizing 
economic interdependence based on earlier work by Baldwin (1980), Hirschman
(1945, 1970), and Keohane and Nye (1989) as well as the literature on trans-
action costs (Williamson 1975, 1985, 1996). I then develop a theoretical model 
to establish a causal link between this interdependence and conflict. The 
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1 Copeland (1996) and Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer (2001) are exceptions here. Copeland’s rational
expectations argument suggests that expected changes in the benefits of trade could motivate con-
flict. Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer argue that severing economic ties signals resolve in disputes such
that opposing states pursue negotiated settlements. Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer, however, treat eco-
nomic ties strictly as a benefit, not a source of alternative conflict.
model informs us as to when and why economic interdependence may have 
a positive or negative influence (or neither) on the onset of conflict. This repre-
sents an important shift away from the search for linear relationships to a better
understanding of the causal linkage between economics and conflict. An empir-
ical analysis follows, providing support for the hypotheses derived from 
the formal analysis of the theory. This support indicates that economic interde-
pendence does indeed decrease the likelihood of high-level conflict, but it also
increases the likelihood of low-level conflict. In addition, it confirms the need 
to go beyond basic trade indicators in empirical tests of the interdependence-
conflict puzzle.
Economic Interdependence
It is not surprising that the concept of economic interdependence is not fully
developed in studies concerning its relationship with conflict, given that work in
this area has involved sophisticated large-n research designs requiring easily
quantifiable measures of variables that remain consistent over long periods of
time. While measures of conflict have been refined over the years (Jones, Bremer,
and Singer 1996; Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972), measures of economic ties
have been constrained by realities of data availability over long time periods. For
some time, however, international political economy scholars have maintained
that economic interdependence is not merely a function of current economic
activity (Baldwin 1980, 1985; Hirschman 1945; Keohane and Nye 1989). Rather,
it is a function of economic activity within the context of available alternatives.
If we assume that states are involved in economic relationships that maximize
welfare, then the costs involved in exiting these relationships are essentially what
is lost in switching from this “best” option to the next best alternative.2 I define
the opportunity costs associated with these alternatives as exit costs.3 Exit costs
are incurred if economic ties with a partner are severed. Both the degree to which
the ties are severed and the ease in which the interested parties can find alterna-
tive sources for economic exchange determine the intensity of these costs.
This is not to argue that the level of economic interaction is not important.
Certainly, levels of exchange help us define the magnitude of economic ties.
Beyond these levels, however, we must also know the costs states face if these
ties are broken. Two economic characteristics that define transaction costs in
firms, asset specificity and market structure, serve to conceptualize exit costs at
the state level.
The literature on transaction cost economics sheds considerable light on the
factors that drive up the costs of exit. Transaction costs can occur on two levels.
Accepted costs are always a part of the normal interaction between two states.
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2 For example, these alternatives could involve other trading partners or a return to autarky.
3 Exit costs are similar to Baldwin’s (1980) use of the term opportunity costs. I adopt the new ter-
minology to highlight Hirschman’s (1970) concept of exit as the source of these costs.
For example, trade routes require the capacity to transport goods and services
across geographical and political boundaries. The economic infrastructure
between states is often complex and expensive, and states willingly bear these
costs in order to attain the benefits that motivate the economic ties. These costs
are made by a state in order to enjoy the benefits of trade. There exists, however,
the potential for additional costs as a result of changes in the relationship or the
economic infrastructure between those states. These are the costs associated with
adaptation.
A key element to these adaptation costs lies in the specificity of the assets
involved in the existing economic transactions. Williamson defines asset speci-
ficity as “the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and
by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value” (1996, 59). Hirschman
also recognizes the importance of asset specificity in determining exit costs.
Using the term “mobility of resources,” he details how the fungibility of assets
can divert exit costs (1945, 28). Rigid, immobile resources make states vulnera-
ble to trading partners. Resources that are more fungible enable states to adapt
to potential changes that other states may threaten to impose.
Market structure also determines the extent to which economic exit generates
the need to alter these factors of production. A state that incurs economic 
exit may have other potential partners with which to establish new ties. As these
alternatives become scarce, current relationships become more costly to break.
Gowa identifies this ability to find substitutes in the market as the key to oppor-
tunity costs (1994, 118). Put simply, a market full of easily accessible substitutes
will ameliorate much of the potential costs of economic exit from trading 
partners.
Together, market power interacts with asset specificity to delineate the context
within which economic interaction takes place. Embedding dyadic economic
activity within this systemic and domestic context provides crucial information
about the economic relationship. If the concept of economic interdependence 
represents something more than simple or proportional trade levels, it must be
grounded in this notion of exit costs. These costs are a function of market 
structure, asset specificity, and the level of economic activity. High levels of 
interaction exacerbate interdependence, but only when market conditions con-
strain adaptation. Thus, the highest forms of interdependence exist when exit
options are scarce, adaptation is costly, and the economic relationship is highly
salient.
The Exit Model
With this concept of interdependence in mind, I turn now to the task of demon-
strating a causal link between economic interdependence and political conflict. I
develop a strategic model of Hirschman’s (1945) classic scenario where one state
seeks to use its economic relationship with another as bargaining leverage over
an independent issue. This model is simple by design in order to focus on 
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the fundamental theoretical relationship, but it allows for a multitude of 
complications.4
In this model there are two states: a challenger and a target. The challenger
wants something from the target, and it must decide whether to issue a demand
or keep quiet and forgo any effort to obtain what it desires. For example, the chal-
lenger may wish to reclaim some territory, as was the case when Great Britain
demanded that Argentina relinquish its claim on the South Georgia and South
Sandwich Islands in 1982. This demand can also be strictly political, as in a call
for change in another country’s human rights policy. It can even be an economic
demand (e.g., Iceland’s demand to extend its exclusive fishing rights to 50 miles
from its coast at the expense of British and West German access). The target, on
the other hand, desires to remain at the status quo. The challenger’s dilemma lies
in how to extract this demand from the target with minimum cost. One option
the challenger has is to use its economic ties with the target to extract its demands
from an otherwise unwilling partner. To do this, the challenger attaches a threat
of economic exit to its demand in an attempt to compel the target to concede.5
This game captures the reactive demand behavior of international economic
sanctions, but it also captures proactive behavior by the challenger when it seeks
to revise the status quo. It also reflects Keohane and Nye’s (1989) notion of states
using economic tools in bargaining without sacrificing the possibility of the use
of military tools when necessary. Most important, the game allows us to ask if,
how, and when economic interdependence can prove effective in bargaining and
replace military force as the tool of choice when resolving disputes.
The Game
The challenger makes the first move: it faces the choice of whether to make a
political demand upon the target or remain at the status quo. The political demand
in this game is accompanied by a threat of economic exit by the challenger in the
event that the target does not comply with its request. The target makes the second
move of this game, and it must choose between rejecting the challenger’s demand
and complying with it. If it complies, the game ends with the challenger gaining
the utility of its demand, VCH, and the target losing the utility VT.
If the target rejects the demand, the game continues with the challenger’s
second move, in which it must choose whether to make good on its threat of eco-
nomic exit or back down and withdraw its demand. If the challenger does not
exit the economic relationship, the game ends. This brings with it audience costs,
RCH, for the challenger, and audience rewards, RT, for the target (Fearon 1994a).
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4 For simplicity the model assumes complete information of player types, and exit options are
modeled as discrete instead of continuous bargaining ranges.
5 Such threats can be proactive or reactive. Sanctions often overlap here, but not all threats of sanc-
tions imply significant exit costs. When President Carter threatened a grain embargo against the Soviet
Union, for example, the ability of the Soviet Union to satisfy its demand for grain from other sup-
pliers meant that it faced minimal exit costs from President Carter’s actions.
The audience costs can be domestic; being caught bluffing reveals incompetence
in the leader’s foreign policy skills (Smith 1996). These costs can also be inter-
national, as other states may now expect the challenger is bluffing in other areas
of its interstate activities. On the other hand, the target enjoys the rewards of suc-
cessfully standing up to the challenger’s demands. This enhances the target’s
stature both at home and abroad.
If the challenger acts on its threat and exits the relationship, then the target
must again choose between rejecting and accepting the challenger’s demand. If
the target accepts, the game ends with the challenger gaining the value of its
demand, VCH, minus the adaptive costs that it incurs in the process of economic
exit, eCH. The target not only loses its value of the demand, VT, but also the costs
it endures when the challenger exits the economic relationship, eT. If the target
rejects the demand, then the use of the economic threat to gain political demands
has failed, and the states enter into the arena of military conflict.
I represent the outcome of this conflict as a lottery that determines the victor.
This simplification helps to maintain the focus of the analysis on how these two
states make the decision to eschew the relatively safe, low-level conflict bar-
gaining tools available in the economic arena for the riskier, costlier bargaining
tools associated with militarized conflict.6 The challenger wins the conflict with
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FIGURE 1
The Exit Model
VCH = Value of Demand to Challenger VT      = Value of Demand to Target
rCH  = Audience Costs for Challenger rT       = Audience rewards for Target
eCH  = Economic Costs of Exit to Challenger eT       = Economic Costs of Exit to Target
p      = Probability of Challenger Winning Dispute (1-p)  = Prob. of Target Winning






























































6 This is not to imply that these states leap from economic exit directly to war; simply that contin-
ued conflict after economic exit represents a departure from the use of the economic relationship to
settle the dispute. The use of a lottery to represent the outcome of such crises is fairly standard (e.g.,
probability p and loses with probability 1 - p. Win or lose, both states pay the
adaptation costs of economic exit, as well as the costs associated with the con-
flict, cCH and cT. Winning generates gains VCH for the challenger. These expected
utilities are represented along with the basic game structure in Figure 1.
Analysis
Three equilibria (see Appendix) emerge from this analysis: a constraint equi-
librium, in which the costs of exit deter the challenger from issuing a demand; a
bargaining power equilibrium, in which the costs of exit for the target allow the
challenger to induce the target to agree to its demands; and a crisis equilibrium,
in which the use of economic tools of persuasion fails and militarized conflict
ensues. Below I discuss the logic that underpins the derivation of these equilib-
ria and then examine their implications.
The focus of the analysis on the cost parameters associated with economic 
exit (eCH and eT) produces an exit cost threshold for each player (e*CH and e*T).
7
An exit cost threshold is the level of exit costs beyond which a player cannot
endure exit. Thus, a challenger whose actual exit costs exceed its exit cost thresh-
old will not move to initiate economic exit in the game. Similarly, a target 
state with exit costs that exceed its threshold will accept a demand before the
challenger exits.
Three factors govern the thresholds: the value of the issue at stake in the
demand being made by the challenger, the costs of escalating to militarized con-
flict in the event of such an outcome, and the probability that the challenger or
target will be successful in the event of conflict. The following equations define




• When the challenger’s exit costs are greater than its exit cost threshold, but 
the target’s exit costs are less than its threshold (eCH > e*CH and eT < e*T), 
then the challenger is deterred from making a demand. This is the constraint
and e p V cT T T
* = -( ) -1
let e pV cCH CH CH
* = -
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see Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Morrow 1994), but not universally accepted. Wagner (2000)
argues against the use of lotteries to collapse the dynamic bargaining processes involved in conflict
into a simple roll of the dice. Even models that do resort to lotteries to capture uncertainty in con-
flict outcomes may explicitly model the dispute escalation process (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman
1992; Fearon 1994b).
7 These thresholds are also commonly referred to as reference points or tipping points. As the
payoffs of this game are a function of the cost and benefit parameters, the researcher has flexibility
in terms of solving for a specific parameter. My decision to focus on the exit-cost parameter is driven
by the substantive interests of this study, but one could just as easily center the analysis around the
probability of winning a militarized conflict (p), or the value of the issue at stake (V ).
equilibrium, because the challenger here is constrained by the economic 
relationship.
• When both players’ exit costs are less than their exit cost thresholds (eCH < e*CH
and eT < e*T), then the challenger makes a demand, the target rejects it, the chal-
lenger exits, and the target again rejects the demand. Conflict is not constrained
by the economic relationship and jumps to higher levels (such as threats of
force, militarized disputes, war, etc.). This is the crisis equilibrium.
• When the target’s exit costs exceed its exit cost threshold (eT > e*T), the chal-
lenger makes a demand and the target complies. This is the bargaining power
equilibrium, as the target’s level of interdependence affords the challenger bar-
gaining power. Note that this equilibrium holds even when the challenger’s exit
costs also exceed its own threshold. Because the target state is unwilling to bear
the costs of exit, the challenger can extract demands without the fear of endur-
ing its own exit costs.
The three equilibria show that all three interdependence-conflict relationships
suggested in the literature are possible. The constraint equilibrium is compatible
with the argument that economic interdependence reduces conflict because the
challenger’s exit costs prevent the initiation of a demand that can lead to conflict.
The bargaining power equilibrium is partially compatible with the argument that
economic interdependence generates conflict. In this equilibrium, the challenger
gets what it wants through the use of threats, far from a utopian or classic liberal
world. These threats and demands can be thought of as low-level conflict, as they
are manifestations of a dispute between the two states but do not lead to milita-
rized conflict. This is not to say, however, that the economic interdependence
causes conflict. The only circumstance in which the economic interaction between
two states is the cause of interstate conflict occurs when there is an economic
issue motivating the challenger’s demand. This special case aside, the bargaining
power equilibrium demonstrates that economic interdependence can sometimes
enable low-level conflict.
Finally, the crisis equilibrium demonstrates that economic interdependence is
not always sufficient to persuade either side from backing down. In this equilib-
rium, the economic behavior has no impact on the incidence of conflict (unless
an economic issue motivates the initial demand made by the challenger). This
equilibrium occurs when the exit-cost thresholds for both states exceed the actual
exit costs faced in the game. Both states are able to absorb the costs of exit and
stand firm, and the economic arena becomes ineffective in resolving the dispute.
Several factors can lead to this result. The value states place on the issue at stake
may be high enough to push the exit-cost thresholds above the actual exit costs.
Similarly, if the costs of higher levels of conflict are minimal, then states are less
likely to balk at exchanging economic gloves for military ones. These three equi-
libria demonstrate that the effect of economic interdependence on political con-
flict must be assessed within the context of the political and military dimensions
of the situation.
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Empirical Analysis
Hypotheses: Deriving Implications from the Exit Model
The analysis of the exit model focuses on the relationship between exit costs
and exit-cost thresholds for both the target and the challenger. Four possible com-
binations of the exit cost and exit-cost threshold parameters produce three equi-
librium paths, each with a unique predicted outcome of the game. Table 1
summarizes these variable combinations and the associated outcomes. Two basic
hypotheses emerge regarding the causal impact of economic interdependence
upon political conflict. The first hypothesis involves the ability of the challenger
to use the exit costs of the target (as predicted in the bargaining power equilib-
rium). The second hypothesis sets forth the proposition that economic interde-
pendence creates a more efficient arena within which issues and disputes are
addressed, thereby reducing the occurrence of higher degrees of conflict.
EXIT COSTS AND LOW-LEVEL CONFLICT. The relationships between these vari-
ables and the equilibrium are translated here into testable hypotheses. The first
task is to differentiate between the economic conditions that lead to status-quo
versus low-conflict behavior. The constraint equilibrium suggests that the status
quo obtains when the challenger faces exit costs that exceed its threshold and the
target faces exit costs that are less than its threshold (eCH > e*CH and eT < e*T). 
The bargaining power equilibrium, on the other hand, states that low-level con-
flict occurs when the target faces exit costs that exceed its threshold (eT > e*T).
Status-quo and low-level conflict outcomes differ in the target’s exit costs vis-à-
vis its exit-cost threshold. This threshold is a function of the value the target
places on the issue at stake, as well as the costs of high-level conflict and the
likelihood of winning such a conflict. Quantifying this value of the demand for
either state on a large-n basis is not possible, which in turn makes the exit cost
thresholds unobservable.
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TABLE 1
Exit Costs and Equilibrium Behavior
Equilibrium Exit Cost—Threshold Relationship Predicted Outcome
Case 1: eCH > e*CH, Status Quo
Constraint eT < e*T
Case 2: eT > e*T, eCH > e*CH Low-Level Conflict
Bargaining Power or
eT > e*T, eCH < e*CH
Case 3: eCH < e*CH, High-Level Conflict
Escalation eT < e*T
(*) denotes threshold vs. actual exit costs.
A solution to this problem is to make some abstract assumptions about the like-
lihood of where an exit-cost threshold lies on the range of possible values
(Crescenzi 1999). The exit-cost threshold splits the range of possible exit costs
into two spaces. Exit costs that are less than the threshold are associated with
either the status quo or high-level conflict. Exit costs that exceed the threshold
are associated with the occurrence of low-level conflict initiated by the challenger.
Assuming that the exit-cost threshold is unknown but fixed (with all values
equally likely), it follows that higher levels of exit costs are more likely to be in
this second set and thus associated with low-level conflict. These assumptions
allow me to propose the first hypothesis:
H1: Higher exit costs for the target increase the likelihood of low-level con-
flict. Higher challenger exit costs will not increase the likelihood of low-
level conflict.
EXIT COSTS AND HIGH-LEVEL CONFLICT. The exit costs to cost-threshold rela-
tionships for the challenger and target in the crisis equilibrium stipulate the 
conditions for which economic interdependence is ineffective in reducing the
occurrence of high levels of conflict. Table 1 shows that both states have to face
exit costs that are lower than their respective thresholds (eCH < e*CH and eT < e*T).
This joint condition leads to the next hypothesis:
H2: Higher exit costs for the target or challenger decrease the likelihood of
high-level conflict.
Since high exit costs for either state can decrease the incidence of high-level 
conflict, directionality of events within the dyad is not important for these
hypotheses.
Research Design
POLITICAL CONFLICT. The predictions emerging from the exit model suggest
political behavior between states should be organized into three categories: status
quo behavior, low-level conflict, and high-level conflict. The conflict variable
should also reflect directionality within the dyad. As the exit model is a story
about the presence or absence of conflict and does not touch on cooperation
between states, I incorporate cooperation and neutral interaction into the cate-
gory of status quo behavior. Low-level conflict is defined here as behavior involv-
ing nonmilitary threats, demands, and actions against another state aimed at
changing the status quo (including the threat or imposition of economic sanc-
tions, halting negotiations, and breaking agreements). The essential characteris-
tic of this type of event is that it is employed by a state to change some dimension
of its political or economic relationship with another state, but with no indica-
tion that the revisionist state resorts to military tools to achieve its goals. Con-
sequently, high-level conflict involves the use of military tools and threats against
another state. This includes threats where force is specified, meaning troop move-
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ment and displays of possible force, as well as the use of force. The general rule
applied is that the state initiating this behavior is willingly using the military arena
to address an issue or dispute it has with a target state.
The standard data set employed to represent political conflict variables in quan-
titative studies of international conflict is the Militarized Interstate Dispute data
(Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). However, I require information regarding low-
level as well as high-level conflict. As its name suggests, the MID data are con-
cerned only with the threat or use of militarized force and thus capture only the
presence or absence of high-level conflict. I therefore use the World Events Inter-
action Survey (WEIS) data for this variable (Goldstein 1992). The data were orig-
inally coded categorically, with 61 different kinds of events representing the scope
of information captured. Each event is coded directionally, with an actor initiat-
ing the event against a target. I assume here that the terms actor and challenger
are synonymous. I have recoded these events into the three broader categories
using the above criteria.8 The result captures the quality of these events that are
key to this study (the presence and quality of conflict) without restricting the
range of possible issues that motivate interstate disagreements.
TRADE, INELASTICITY, AND EXIT COSTS. The challenge here is to develop a valid
measure of exit costs while maintaining the systematic approach of a large-n
analysis. I interact bilateral price elasticity data (Marquez 1990) with trade activ-
ity data (Barbieri 1995; Oneal and Russett 1997) in a joint representation of
market structure, asset specificity, and intensity of potential economic exit costs.
Measuring these factors of exit costs presents a difficult hurdle because the major-
ity of empirical work appears in the form of single-country case studies (see
Alston, Eggertsson, and North 1996; Williamson 1996). I operationalize exit
costs using two pieces of information in order to establish a broadly applicable
measurement of a state’s ability to adapt to economic change. The first involves
measuring market structure and asset specificity using the inelasticity of import
prices. Price elasticity measures the sensitivity of a nation to a change in the price
of imports using the following simplified logic (Landsburg 1995):
(3)
Price elasticity is a measure of a state’s ability to adjust its demand for imports
given a change in import prices. A state that is able to curb its demand for imports
when prices rise and expand its demand for these imports when prices fall has
an elastic demand for the imports. At the other end of the spectrum, a state that
Price Elasticity 
Percentage Change in Quanitity of Imports
Percentage Change in Price of Imports
= .
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8 The recategorization is available from the author by request. Goldstein (1992) adapts these cate-
gories into a conflict-cooperation scale (-10 to 8.3). Events ranging from +8.3 to -3.4 are coded as
status quo events; -3.4 to -6.9 are low-level conflict events; and -7.0 to -10.0 are high-level con-
flict events.
cannot alter the amount of imports it needs given an increase or decrease in prices
has an inelastic demand.
Price elasticities are often discussed at the goods level, and it is natural to
expect that import price elasticities will vary across goods imported from any
given state. This is problematic for this study because I wish to explain the dyadic
conflict behavior of states. Unpacking the exit costs variable without a strong 
theoretical explanation for how these good-specific elasticities influence foreign
policy decision making is dangerous. For example, the presence of inelastic labor-
intensive goods may be irrelevant if state leadership is supported by a capital-
intensive winning coalition. Marquez (1990) has estimated bilateral import price
elasticities that are aggregated to the dyad level, providing information regard-
ing one state’s elasticity for the aggregation of all imports from another state. The
resulting elasticity estimates allow the extraction of information on one state’s
market relationship with another, as state-level elasticities reflect a state’s ability
to react to economic change initiated by another state. In addition to being bilat-
eral and aggregated at the state level, the elasticity scores are directional, such
that Germany’s elasticity score for imports from France is not necessarily the
same as France’s score for German imports.
Because demand elasticities reflect the slope of the demand curve, they 
are always negative or zero. A score of zero indicates perfect inelasticity, and
larger negative scores reflect increased elasticity. For the purposes of this study
I have adjusted these scores such that positive scores reflect inelasticity and a
score of zero indicates the most elastic score in the data set.9 I label this indica-
tor Inelasticityij, such that Inelasticityij is state I’s price inelasticity of imports
from state J.
The Marquez data, unfortunately, are limited in spatial and temporal scope.
The countries included in his study are Canada, Germany, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. He also includes aggregate group estimates for
the rest of the OECD countries, as well as LDC and OPEC countries.10 Data from
1973 to 1984 are used to compute the elasticity scores, but the scores themselves
are cross-sectional and do not vary over time. Indeed, Marquez tests these esti-
mates for temporal stability and finds that the aggregate price elasticity scores do
not vary during the 1973–84 period.
While the Marquez elasticity data measures the adaptability of states to
changes in import prices from other states, it is also important to assess the degree
to which a state needs to implement these changes. That is, I require a measure
of dyadic economic activity relative to each state’s economy and trade portfolio
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9 This is accomplished by adding the absolute value of the most elastic score to all the estimates.
10 Marquez uses data from the Direction of Trade data set published by the International Monetary
Fund (1993). I disaggregate the “rest of the OECD” group into Italy and France, but exclude the other
groupings because there are too many states included in each group to obtain useful information.
Polachek (1997) and Polachek, Chang, and Robst (1999) set a precedent for the extraction of Italy
and France from the “ROECD” group. Since, however, both states will have identical elasticity
vectors, I do not include the France-Italy or Italy-France dyads in this study.
in the global market. This information is important because the degree to which
one state involves another in its economy provides additional information about
how costly it would be for the first state to endure an exit from this economic
relationship. Just as a trade relationship can represent a large portion of a state’s
economy but still not be costly if this trade is elastic, the same relationship can
be inelastic but still not be costly if this trade represents only a small portion of
its economy or total global trade. To capture this concept of the degree of trade
relative to a state’s total trade or economy, I include Barbieri’s (1995) measure of
dyadic imports and exports relative to a state’s total trade: TradeShare. The
TradeShare indicator is dyadic and directional, such that
(4)
where DyadicTradeij is the total imports and exports between states I and J.
11
Trade data are obtained from Barbieri’s International Trade data set (Barbieri
2002).12 The data are averaged into one cross-sectional value for each directed
dyad in order to match the Marquez elasticity data.13 Case selection is also limited
to the spatial set determined by the elasticity data. Such limitations have inspired
researchers to eschew elasticity data in favor of increased generality and spatio-
temporal domains (Barbieri 1995), but I argue that the concept of economic inter-
dependence cannot be validly operationalized using trade scores alone.
Using both the elasticity and the tradeshare data, I define exit costs for state I
with respect to state J as:
(5)
This variable represents economic interdependence in the dyadic relationship.
The use of import price elasticity and trade data provides a useful but imper-
fect operationalization of exit costs. It is useful because the inelasticity dimen-
sion captures most of the market structure information needed to identify
interdependence. The inelasticity score measures the degree to which a state is
unable to reduce demand or find alternate sources of imports from another state.
In addition, the proportional trade dimension approximates the intensity of the
trade relationship. The measure is also imperfect, for example, because it does
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11An alternative indicator of this degree of economic interaction represents the total imports 
and exports, this time normalized by state I’s Gross Domestic Product (Oneal and Russett 1997): 
. There is considerable debate regarding which operationalization of this
trade intensity is the more valid measure. The Barbieri measure captures the degree to which state I
relies on state J for imports relative to all of I’s import needs. The Oneal and Russett TradeGDPij
measure captures the intensity of imports from state J relative to I’s domestic economy. Logic and
regression diagnostics suggest that the two indicators are also quite related, so only Barbieri’s measure
will be used in the analysis. All the models were run with both measures, however, with consistent
results.
12 GDP data for Oneal and Russett’s measure is obtained from the Penn World Tables (Mark 5.6)
(Heston and Summers 1991, 1994).







not account for third-party interdependence. Nevertheless, it is a significant
improvement over existing measures. Situations of high levels of economic 
activity characterized by high elasticity for both states are not characterized as
interdependent.
AGGREGATION ISSUES AND METHODOLOGY. In order to match the format of the
Marquez elasticity data, the WEIS event data are collapsed from its daily (at least
hypothetically) coding to one observation for the entire temporal period of 1966
to 1992. I extract the highest level of conflict during this period.14 The loss of
information from this temporal aggregation ranges from minor to extensive.
Some dyads such as Canada-Germany are represented in the WEIS data set in
only 5 days during this 27-year period. Their spotty presence in the data suggests
that less drastic aggregations such as yearly data would lead to the opposite
problem of not enough information. Other dyads such as the United States and
Japan, however, contain over 700 observations over the 27-year period, and focus-
ing only on the most conflictual level of conflict leads to a stark reduction in the
available information. Even yearly aggregation in these high-profile dyads,
however, can truncate over 50 observations into one. Nonetheless, this aggrega-
tion does have advantages. First, it places the 40 directed dyads in the study on
equal footing in the data set in that each is represented by one observation. This
eliminates a previous bias toward the dyads containing high-profile states (espe-
cially the United States). Second, the content validity of the measure is main-
tained because information can still be extracted regarding the occurrence of low-
and high-level conflict.
The most restrictive problem stemming from the constraints imposed by using
the Marquez data is the lack of dyads that have encountered the most extreme
form of political conflict: interstate war. This restriction limits the validity of this
study so that I cannot make conclusions about the impact of economic interde-
pendence on war. This limitation highlights the tradeoff between obtaining valid
measures of economic interdependence and obtaining valid measures of political
conflict (see Barbieri 1995). It is important to point out, however, that these data
constraints bias the analysis in favor of rejecting hypothesis 2. Because the
Marquez elasticity data are limited to advanced Western democracies, the prob-
ability of high-level conflict is reduced (if not eliminated) by a host of factors
(joint democracy, alliances, etc.). A secondary limitation is that virtually all of
the standard control variables present in current empirical research in the study
of conflict are inapplicable. The cross-sectional elasticity data also make pooled
cross-sectional time series methods inappropriate. While the data constraints are
a source of frustration, they do not aid in the empirical confirmation of my the-
oretical model. Quite simply, the Marquez data are the only bilateral, directional
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14 The basic coding rule for the MIDs data is to report the highest level of hostility in any given
dyad-year. Using the average level of conflict with respect to the three categories of status quo, low-
level, and high-level conflict produced similar results.
price elasticity data available at this level of analysis, and the concept of eco-
nomic interdependence as developed in this article cannot be operationalized by
trade data alone. In this author’s opinion, the benefits of employing the elasticity
data to generate exit-cost data, combined with the ability to observe low-level as
well as high-level conflict, outweigh the costs outlined above.
Results
Low-Level Conflict and Target’s Exit Costs
The dichotomous nature of the dependent variables, low-level conflict and
high-level conflict, suggests the use of logistic regression techniques (King 1989;
Liao 1994). The first model evaluates the claim that an increase in the target’s
exit costs leads to an increase in low-level conflict initiated by the challenger
(H1). Support for this hypothesis would come in the form of a positive and sta-
tistically significant parameter estimate for the Exit Coststc variable in equation
(6) below. Because studies have shown that import price inelasticity and trade
variables can have an independent effect on conflict (Barbieri 1996; Oneal and
Russett 1997; Polachek 1997; Polachek, Chang, and Robst 1999; Polachek and
McDonald 1992), I include these independent variables throughout the analysis
to ensure the proper estimation of the interactive Exit Costs variables.15
(6)
Column 1 of Table 2 displays the estimation results of this first model. The
parameter estimate for the ExitCoststc variable is positive and statistically signif-
icant at the p < 0.05 level, providing support for the prediction that an increase
in the target’s exit costs indeed increases the likelihood of low level conflict. The
next set of models examines the prediction of the exit model that the challenger’s
exit cost levels do not affect low-level conflict. The inclusion of independent vari-
ables for the challenger transforms equation (6) into the following:
(7)
In this model, the expectation is that the added ExitCostct variable will not be sta-
tistically significant. Column 2 of Table 2 displays the estimates of this model.
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the challenger’s exit costs do
not have an impact on the incidence of low-level conflict initiated by the chal-
lenger. The addition of the economic variables for the challenger does not reduce
the impact of the target’s exit costs (ExitCosttc) on low-level conflict.
Low Conflict Trade Inelasticity Exit Costs
Trade Inelasticity Exit Costs
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15 For this and the remaining logit models, I present only the variables and parameters involved and
ask the reader to assume the logit model structure is present.
High-Level Conflict and Target’s Exit Costs
Equation (8) examines the claim that an increase in the target’s exit costs leads
to a decrease in the likelihood of high-level conflict (H2):
(8)
The estimates for this model are in the third column of Table 2. The parameter
estimate for the ExitCosts variable is negative and statistically significant at the
p < 0.05 level, providing support for the hypothesis. Model diagnostics indicate
that the model significantly improves on our ability to predict high-level 
conflict.16
For high-level conflict the exit model predicts that higher exit costs for the
challenger will have the same negative effect as the target’s exit costs. Including
the economic independent variables for the challenger changes equation (8) to
the following equation:
(9)
For this model, I expect ExitCoststc and ExitCostsct to be negative. Estimates of
this model are included in column 4 of Table 3. The parameter estimates for both
variables are in the expected direction, but only ExitCoststc is statistically signif-
icant. Likelihood ratio tests indicate that the challenger variables do not enhance
the ability of the model to predict the occurrence of high-level conflict. The
results indicate that the target state’s exit costs remain an important predictor for
the absence of high-level conflict. The challenger, however, may not be as con-
strained as the theory predicts.17
Interpreting the Impact of Exit Costs
The inclusion of the interaction terms (ExitCostct, ExitCosttc) can make the
coefficients in Table 2 difficult to interpret.18 Figure 2 demonstrates graphically
how the interaction of trade and inelasticity is critical to the likelihood of low-
and high-level conflict. Both figures are generated by varying inelasticity and
tradeshare simultaneously. Figure 2A shows that when either variable is low, the
likelihood of low-level conflict is also low. Only when both variables increase
significantly does the likelihood of low-level conflict increase. Similarly, the like-
H Conflict Trade Inelasticity Exit Costs
Trade Inelasticity Exit Costs
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16 Using TradeGDP, the impact of ExitCosts on High-Level Conflict remains negative and statis-
tically significant, although the significance level drops to the p < .10 level.
17 The parameter for the Challenger’s Exit Costs hovers on the cusp of statistical significance (p =
.119), which may be attributable in part to limitations in sample size.
18 As an additional diagnostic tool, I reestimate equations 7 and 9 using a centering technique to
compensate for the possible multicollinearity between the interaction and the additive terms. The
results continue to support the hypotheses, but the signs for the inelasticity variables flip. Whether
this qualitative change is easily interpretable is a matter of debate.
lihood of high-level conflict is at its lowest point when both trade and inelastic-
ity are high (Figure 2B). A drop in either trade or inelasticity can increase the
likelihood of high-level conflict. These results confirm the predictions of the exit
model. It is this interaction of trade and inelasticity that generates economic exit
costs, and these exit costs have important effects on the incidence and the char-
acter of political conflict.
Because of the limitations and operationalization of the interdependence vari-
able used here, it is difficult to compare the empirical analyses in this project to
current large-n research (Barbieri 1996; Russett and Oneal 2001). Using the elas-
ticity data inhibits a comparable research design. More important, most studies
in this area of research use trade as a proxy for interdependence, but the results
in Table 2 and Figure 2 indicate that trade and interdependence (as defined in this
article) do not necessarily have the same impact on conflict. For example, for
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TABLE 2
Logit Estimates of Low-Level, High-Level Conflict
Dependent Variable
Low-Level Conflict High-Level Conflict
Explanatory Variables Eqn (6) Eqn (7) Eqn (8) Eqn (9)
Target’s TradeShare b -118.166 -211.962 139.212 132.738
SEb 57.793 116.836 62.604 70.317
p .021 .035 .013 .030
Target’s Inelasticity -1.683 -2.688 1.9777* 1.666
.901 1.440 1.326 1.409
.031 .031 .068 .119
Target’s Exit Costs 54.834 90.530 -54.524 -53.808
25.411 47.233 26.385 28.965
.016 .028 .020 .032
Challenger’s TradeShare -23.538 89.9469*
147.795 63.319
.437 .078
Challenger’s Inelasticity 6.1027* .444
4.139 1.040
.070 .335
Challenger’s Exit Costs 6.811 -30.879
60.072 26.150
.455 .119
Constant 1.949 -8.475 -5.5525* -6.8636*
1.741 8.435 2.865 3.815
.263 .315 .053 .072
Log Likelihood -17.592 -11.949 -20.669 -18.657
LR c2 (df) 7.47a (3) 18.75a (6) 13.71a (3) 17.74a (6)
LR p-value .058 .005 .003 .007
Pseudo R2 .175 .440 .249 .322
N = 40. * = p < .10; bold = p < .05; p-values are one-tailed, except Constant; aLR test versus 
null model.
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FIGURE 2A



































low-level conflict there can be beneficial (pacific) effects from trade that are coun-
tered by interdependence only when the exit costs in the economic relationship
exceed the target’s threshold. Similarly, trade may have beneficial (Russett and
Oneal 2001) or deleterious (Barbieri 1996) effects on the likelihood of milita-
rized conflict, but interdependence only constrains the use of militarized conflict
when at least one state has exit costs exceeding the threshold. The goal is not to
crown a winner in the great debate, but rather to suggest an alternative approach
to solving the puzzle.
Conclusions
The theoretical arguments and empirical work of this article suggest that the
time has come to move beyond the long-standing debate over whether economic
interdependence has a purely pacific or conflictual influence in world politics.
Using a simple modeling technique, I demonstrate that the relationship between
economic interdependence and conflict is conditional not only upon the ability
of nations to alter or forgo their economic ties, but also the issues at stake in their
political discourse and the ever-present context of relative power. Based on these
conditions, the causal link can be pacific, conflictual, or nonexistent. This article
suggests that future research in this area should focus on identifying when and
why each particular causal relationship prevails. The theoretical model developed
here is a first step, but more research is needed.
Multilateral models are needed to assess some of the more subtle implications
of interdependence theory. One could also study the effects of relaxing several
of the assumptions imposed on the exit model. For example, relaxing the assump-
tion that challengers prefer the status quo to paying the audience costs associated
with failed exit threats can help explain much of the sanctioning behavior we
observe between states. Endogenizing the demand made by the challenger and
the degree of economic exit enables the researcher to consider a broader range
of policy behavior. Finally, allowing for the reality that states harbor private 
information about the value they attach to the issues of dispute captures the 
inherent uncertainties that plague these bargaining processes. Empirical support
indicates that the exit model provides new and interesting insight about the inter-
dependence-conflict relationship, but more work needs to be done. Expanding
the set of available dyads for analysis to include dyads that are not both demo-
cratic, have fought wars, and are less economically active would strengthen the
ability of the empirical analyses to make more general claims about the causal
relationship between interdependence and conflict.
All of these extensions of the exit model may prove fruitful, but they should
not overshadow the importance of laying out the basic model as a foundation for
theories of economic interdependence and conflict. In this simple format, the exit
model generates innovative predictions about the interdependence-conflict rela-
tionship. Future research may profit by focusing on the conditions that lead to
exit costs that exceed a state’s threshold and the ways in which these costs con-
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strain or empower political leaders. This future research, whether it is expanded
spatially or temporally, will be able to take advantage of the theoretical platform
established by the exit model.
Appendix
To analyze the equilibrium outcomes of this game, I employ a sequential equi-
librium solution concept (Gibbons 1992; Morrow 1994). Mixed strategy equi-
libria are not considered in this analysis. I make the following initial assumptions:
eCH, eT ≥ 0; VT, VCH ≥ 0; RCH, RT > 0.
Target’s Second Move: Reject or Comply
Beginning with the last move of the game, the target decides whether to reject
or concede:
(10)
Solving for VT produces a threshold value, VT*, for the target.
(11)
The target rejects the challenger’s demand when VT > V*T, and complies when 
VT < V*T.
Challenger’s Second Move: Exit or Back Down
The next step is to examine the challenger’s second move in the game. If the
challenger backs down, then the target does not respond; if the challenger exits
the economic relationship, then the target can either reject the challenger a second
time or comply with its demands. Case 1 assumes the target complies, and Case
2 assumes it rejects the demand in the final round.
Case One: VT < V*T (Target Complies)
If the target complies with the challenger’s demands in the final node, the chal-
lenger will receive VCH - eCH. Otherwise it recieves -RCH:
(12)
Unless RCH > eCH - VCH, the challenger will choose to exit when the target com-
plies.
Case Two: VT > V*T (Target Rejects)
If VT > V*T, the challenger faces a choice between backing down and enduring
audience costs or entering into escalated conflict with the target. Indifference
holds when:
(13)p V e c p e c RCH CH CH CH CH CH- -( ) + -( ) - -( ) = -1







p V e c p e c V eT T T T T T T- - -( ) + -( ) - -( ) = - -1
828 Mark J. C. Crescenzi
Let R*CH be the threshold of audience costs such that when R*CH > RCH, the chal-
lenger backs down. When R*CH < RCH, the challenger exits the economic relation-
ship.
(14)
Target’s First Move: Reject or Comply
Three cases are considered by the target when weighing its options between
rejecting the demand made by the challenger and complying. The first involves
the scenario in which the challenger will back down if the target rejects the initial
demand. The second and third cases deal with a scenario in which the challenger
will exit the economic relationship if the target rejects the initial demand. In case
two, the target will comply in the second round after the challenger exits. In case
three, the target rejects the challenger’s demands in both rounds of the game.
Case One: R*CH > RCH (Challenger Will Back Down)
(15)
The target will reject this demand if the challenger will back down in response.
Case Two: R*CH < RCH, VT < V*T (Challenger Will Exit, Target Will Comply)
A target that will comply in its second move will also comply in its first move:
(16)
The target always prefers to comply early instead of after exit (weekly prefers it
if eT = 0).
Case Three: R*CH < RCH, VT > V*T (Challenger Will Exit, Target Will Reject)
If the target rejects the demand in the first round, it faces escalated conflict. If
the target complies in the first round, it loses the value it associates with the
demand:
(17)
Solving for eT generates an exit cost threshold for the target, e*T, which drives
its choice between compliance and rejecting the initial demand:
(18)
This exit cost threshold is a function of the probability that the target will win
the escalated conflict, the value that it associates with the demand, and the costs
the target incurs in the escalated conflict. When the costs of exit are below this
threshold, eT < e*T, the target will reject the demand and escalated conflict will
result. When the costs of exit exceed this threshold, eT > e*T, the target cannot
afford to endure the costs associated with rejecting the demand. The target com-
plies with the challenger’s demand at its first opportunity.
e p V cT T T
* = -( ) -1
p V e c p e c VT T T T T T- - -( ) + -( ) - -( ) = -1
- ≥ - -V V e V eT T T T T, ,for all 
Give  for all R R V R V RCH CH T T T T
* > - <, , ,
R e c pVCH CH CH CH
* = + -
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Challenger’s First Move: Demand or Not Demand
In this first move of the game, there are three scenarios for the challenger to
consider. In case one, the target will comply with the initial demand in its first
move. In the second and third cases, the target will reject this initial demand and
the challenger will have to either act on its exit threat or back down. Case two
considers the scenario in which the challenger backs down, and case three con-
siders the scenario in which the challenger exits and the target again rejects the
demand.
Case One: eT > e*T (Target Will Comply in First Round)
If the challenger knows that the target will comply when first faced with a
demand, then the challenger faces two possibilities: remain at the status quo or
successfully extract its demand. The challenger will always prefer to extract this
demand rather than remain at the status quo:
(19)
Case Two: eT < e*T, R*CH > RCH (Target Rejects, Challenger Backs Down)
Here the challenger knows that if it makes a demand the target will reject it
and the challenger will then back down. The challenger will always prefer to
remain at the status quo:
(20)
Case Three: eT < e*T, R*CH < RCH (Target Rejects, Challenger Exits, Target 
Rejects)
Here the challenger is resolute in its threat of exit, and the target is resolved
to reject the demand. If the challenger does not make a demand, the status quo
results. If the challenger makes the demand, escalated conflict results:
(21)
Solving for the challenger’s exit costs reveals an exit cost threshold for the chal-
lenger, e*CH, such that,
(22)
When actual exit costs exceed this threshold, eCH > e*CH, the challenger is deterred
from making the demand, and the status quo results. When its exit costs fall below
this threshold, eCH < e*CH, the challenger makes the demand and escalated conflict
ensues.
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